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RYMER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal challenges Washington law
that denies a statefunded "Promise
Scholarship" to students who are
qualified for it by virtue of high school
grades, family income, and attendance at
an accredited college in the state, solely
because the student decides to pursue a
degree in theology.
Joshua Davey was awarded the
Scholarship but lost it when he declared a
major in Pastoral Ministries at Northwest
College. He claims that this was
discriminatory and denied him access to
funds that were otherwise available to all
eligible students in violation of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment
and his federal and state constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and equal
protection. Washington's Higher
Education Coordinating Board (HECB),
which administers the Promise
Scholarship, defends its action on the
ground that the state did not prohibit
Davey from pursuing religious studies
but simply declined to fund them; that
state funding for Davey's religious
instruction is barred by state law, Wash.
2
Rev.Code § 28B.10.814,'and the state
constitution's provision regarding the
separation of church and state; 2 and that
refusing to award aid to students pursuing
a degree in theology is reasonably related
to the bar in the Washington
Constitution.
We conclude that HECB's policy lacks
neutrality on its face. It makes the
Promise Scholarship (which is neutral
toward religion) available to all students
who meet generally applicable criteria,
except for those who choose a religious
major. As this classification facially
discriminates on the basis of religion, it
must survive strict scrutiny. We are not
persuaded that it does; Washington's
interest in avoiding conflict with its own
constitutional constraint against applying
money to religious instruction is not a
compelling reason to withhold
scholarship funds for a college education
from an eligible student just because he
personally decides to pursue a degree in
theology. Accordingly, we hold that
HECB impermissibly deprived Davey of
his scholarship.
Wash. Rev.Code § 28B.10.814 provides that
"[n]o aid shall be awarded to any student who is
pursuing a degree in theology."
2Article I, § 11 of the Washington Constitution
provides:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of
religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be
guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall
be molested or disturbed in person or property on
account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.
No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment....
I
In 1999, Washington created a new
college scholarship program for low and
middle income students who achieve an
excellent academic record throughout
their high school careers. The award is
known as a "Promise Scholarship." It is
available for the first year of a student's
postsecondary education, and may be
renewed for one additional year. The
Scholarship was worth $1,125 for the
year 1999-2000, and $1,542 for 2000-01.
Private school students may spend their
funds on any education-related expense,
including room and board.
The Washington Higher Education
Coordinating Board administers the
Promise Scholarship. Its overview
announcing the program stated:
To be eligible you must meet these
criteria:
1. Be designated by your high school as
in the top 10% of the 1999 graduating
senior class.
2. Have a family income that is equal to
or less than 135% of the state's median.
3. Attend an accredited public or private
university, college or other accredited
post-secondary institution in the state of
Washington.
Davey applied for the Scholarship and
was selected as a Washington Promise
Scholarship recipient in August 1999. In
the fall he enrolled at Northwest College,
an accredited institution affiliated with
the Assembly of God. Students applying
to Northwest are required to indicate "a
personal commitment to Jesus Christ as
Lord and Savior," and the college
educates students from a "distinctly
Christian" point of view.
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As he is a Christian who intends to
become a cleric, Davey declared a double
major in Pastoral Ministries and Business
Management and Administration. Davey
wanted to go to college, and to pursue
this major, because of his religious
beliefs. A Pastoral Ministries major at
Northwest is designed to prepare students
for a career as a Christian minister.
Classes are taught from a viewpoint that
the Bible represents truth and is
foundational whereas, according to
HECB, theology courses at public
postsecondary institutions in Washington
are taught from an historical and
scholarly point of view.
On October 12, 1999 HECB notified
financial aid administrators throughout
the state that students pursuing a degree
in theology are not eligible to receive the
Washington Promise Scholarship. 3
Northwest determined that majors in
Pastoral Ministries are pursuing a degree
in theology, so it could not certify
Davey's eligibility as HECB required.
As a result, Davey had to choose whether
to follow his calling, or forego the
Scholarship. He decided to give up the
Scholarship, but has been able to pursue
his major.
3HECB's policy is codified at Wash. Admin.
Code § 250-80- 020(12). It provides:
'Eligible student' means a person who:
(a) Graduates from a public or private high school
located in the state of Washington; and
(b) Is in the top ten percent of his or her 1999
graduating class; or
(c) Is in the top fifteen percent of his or her 2000
graduating class; and
(d) Has a family income less than one hundred
thirty-five percent of the state's median; and
(e) Enrolls at least half time in an eligible
postsecondary institution in the state of
Washington; and
(f) Is not pursuing a degree in theology.
Davey brought this action against the
Governor and officials of HECB to
enjoin HECB from refusing to award the
Scholarship to an otherwise eligible
student solely because the student is
pursuing a degree in theology, and for
damages. He and HECB agreed to
escrow Scholarship funds for the 2000-01
school year. Both parties moved for
summary judgment, which the district
court granted in HECB's favor.
Davey timely appealed.
II
A
The parties analyze the authorities from
every possible angle. Their arguments
distill to this:
On the one hand, singling Davey out for
unfavorable treatment in an otherwise
neutral program on account of a religious
major violates the free exercise rule of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct.
2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), as well as
the rule of McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593
(1978), that a state offering a benefit may
not impose a disability on the basis of
religious status. Thus, Washington's
restriction may not stand unless it is
narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest.
On the other hand, declining to subsidize
the exercise of a constitutional right is
permissible under Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d
233 (1991), and Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983).
The focus in free exercise inquiries is on
what the government prohibits rather
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than on what the individual can exact.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct.
1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). Here,
Washington simply refuses to underwrite
the education of students who pursue a
degree in theology, but does not prohibit
Davey from freely practicing or pursuing
his religious views, speaking about them,
or associating with others of like mind.
Accordingly, strict scrutiny is
inapplicable.
The rejoinder is that Regan and Rust do
not apply because the programs there
were set up for the government's own
purposes as a speaker. As a speaker, the
government may selectively fund a
program to encourage activities that it
believes are in the public interest. By
contrast, the purpose of the Promise
Scholarship program is broad: to fund the
educational pursuits of outstanding
students. For this reason, administration
of the Scholarship must be viewpoint
neutral under Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995).
However, it isn't, because state policy
excludes only those recipients who
pursue the study of theology from a
religious perspective.
We recur to basic principles. The First
Amendment declares: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." Thus, the state may
neither favor, nor disfavor, religion. A
law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible.
Whereas a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified
by a compelling government interest
even if it has the incidental effect of
burdening a religious practice, a "law
burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.
To satisfy the commands of the First
Amendment, a law restrictive of religious
practice must advance interests of the
highest order and must be narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests."
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217
Davey submits that HECB's policy fails
Lukumi's neutrality test because the
policy discriminates on its face by
treating those who choose a religious
major unequally. HECB does not
dispute that Davey declared his major for
religious reasons or that doing so is
constitutionally protected; rather, in its
view, Lukumi does not control because
unlike the ordinances at issue there,
Wash. Rev.Code § 28B.10.814 does not
proscribe pursuing a degree in theology
or bar only religiously motivated pursuits.
The object of the ordinances invalidated
in Lukumi was suppression of a central
practice of Santeria worship, the
ritualistic slaughter of animals. As
HECB points out, Wash. Rev.Code §
8B.10.814 neither prohibits religious
conduct nor does its application turn on
the student's religious motivation. In this
respect we agree with HECB that the
Washington statute differs from the
Lukumi ordinances.
However, Wash. Rev.Code §
28B. 10.814 nevertheless implicates the
free exercise interests articulated in
Lukumi. Both the statute and HECB's
implementing policy refer on their face to
religion. The Promise Scholarship
program is administered so as to
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disqualify only students who pursue a
degree in theology from receiving its
benefit; otherwise the Scholarship is
available to all secondary school
graduates who have high enough grades,
low enough income, and attend an
accredited college in the state. And the
policy as applied excludes only those
students who declare a major in theology
that is taught from a religious
perspective.
HECB's policy also lacks neutrality for
the same reason that Tennessee's
disqualification of ministers from public
office, invalidated in McDaniel, lacked
neutrality... .McDaniel, who was an
ordained Baptist minister, wanted to be a
delegate [to state constitutional
convention] but the state supreme court
held that the state's interest in preventing
establishment of religion outweighed the
guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause.
The United States Supreme Court
reversed. It made clear that the right to
the free exercise of religion encompasses
the right to be a minister, and that the
clergy disqualification statute imposed an
impermissible disability on the basis of
religion because McDaniel could not
exercise his right to be a minister and to
hold office at the same time. McDaniel,
435 U.S. at 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322; ...
HECB distinguishes McDaniel on the
footing that McDaniel was prohibited
from being a delegate as a result of being
a minister, whereas Wash. Rev.Code §
28B.10.814 does not prohibit Davey
from pursuing a degree in theology. But
this misses the point of McDaniel: A
state law may not offer a benefit to all
(there, to hold a public position; here, to
hold a Promise Scholarship), but exclude
some on the basis of religion (there,
ministers; here, would-be ministers).
Washington's restriction disables
students majoring in theology from the
benefit of receiving the Scholarship just
as Tennessee's classification disabled
ministers from the benefit of being a
delegate. A minister could not be both a
minister and a delegate in Tennessee any
more than Davey can be both a student
pursuing a degree in theology and a
Promise Scholar in Washington.
HECB asserts that Davey's reliance on
McDaniel is also inapposite because it
presumes a right to state funding for his
religious exercise. HECB submits that
the state has no obligation to underwrite
Davey's pursuit of a religious degree, or
to make it less costly, relying primarily
on Regan and Rust. This is undoubtedly
true in the abstract. Regan and Rust stand
for the proposition that the government,
as speaker or policy-maker, may
selectively sponsor or pay for programs
that it believes to be in the public interest,
without being obliged to fund or
encourage an alternative activity ....
Even so, as the Court states in Regan, the
government may not deny a benefit to a
person because he exercises a
constitutional right, 461 U.S. at 545, 103
S.Ct. 1997; and "[tihe case would be
different if Congress were to discriminate
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way
as to aim [ ] at the suppression of
dangerous ideas." This is what makes
this case different from Rust and Regan,
as McDaniel and Rosenberger indicate.
In Rosenberger, the University
authorized payment of out-side
contractors for the printing costs of
student publications through a Student
Activities Fund, except that costs of
religious activity (in connection with
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publications otherwise eligible for
funding) would not be reimbursed. The
Court distinguished this practice from the
principle recognized in Rust and Regan:
Although acknowledging that the
Government is not required to subsidize
the exercise of fundamental rights, we
reaffirmed the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality in the Government's provision
of financial benefits by observing that
"[t]he case would be different if Congress
were to discriminate invidiously in its
subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas."' Regan
relied on a distinction based on
preferential treatment of certain
speakers-veterans'-organizations and not
a distinction based on the content or
messages of those groups' speech. The
University's regulation now before us,
however, has a speech-based restriction
as its sole rationale and operative
principle.
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834, 115 S.Ct.
2510 (citations omitted). Thus, a
restriction based on religion is aimed at
"suppression of dangerous ideas." And
"ideologically driven attempts to
suppress a particular point of view are
presumptively unconstitutional in
funding, as in other contexts." Id. at 830,
115 S.Ct. 2510. Therefore, once the state
of Washington decided to provide
Promise Scholarships to all students who
meet objective criteria, it had to make the
financial benefit available on a viewpoint
neutral basis.
HECB dismisses Rosenberger because
the University's program there involved
expressive conduct. In its view, Davey's
claims do not involve public funds
designated for expressive conduct, and
Wash. Rev.Code § 28B.10.814 does not
aim at the suppression of ideas through
refusal to underwrite those ideas. We do
not believe Rosenberger can be
distinguished so readily. While the
funding in Rosenberger did involve
student publications (except for religious
publications), funding students'
education (except for students pursuing
religious education) is not much different.
Expressive conduct, creative inquiry, and
the free exchange of ideas are what the
educational enterprise is all about. So is
pursuing a course of study of one's own
choice... .The bottom line is that the
government may limit the scope of a
program that it will fund, but once it
opens a neutral "forum" (fiscal or
physical), with secular criteria, the
benefits may not be denied on account of
religion....
Wash. Rev.Code § 28B.10.814 is
viewpoint based, and because its
viewpoint is based on religion, it does
discriminate against religious ideas. The
Promise Scholarship program itself has a
neutral purpose and is based on objective
criteria. . . . To the extent that the
message behind the Promise Scholarship
is that doing well in high school pays off,
and that going to college in Washington
is a good thing, and that developing the
talents of promising students is of great
importance to the state, it is qualified
with the message "unless the student
pursues a degree in theology from a
religious perspective." This necessarily
communicates disfavor, and
discriminates in distributing the subsidy
in such a way as to suppress a religious
point of view.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct.
1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), says
nothing to the contrary. HECB
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particularly relies on language in the
opinion emphasizing that "[t]he crucial
word in the constitutional text [of the
Free Exercise Clause] is 'prohibit': 'For
the Free Exercise Clause is written in
terms of what the government cannot do
to the individual, not in terms of what the
individual can exact from the
government.'" Id. at 451, 108 S.Ct. 1319
(quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412, 83
S.Ct. 1790 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
While of course this is what the Clause
says, "[w]hat the First Amendment
precludes the government from
commanding directly, it also precludes
the government from accomplishing
indirectly." Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 77-78, 110 S.Ct.
2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (citing
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332).
More importantly, Lyng sheds no light on
whether the government may except from
a neutral program that benefits all who
meet secular criteria only those who will
use the benefit for a religious reason. The
question in Lyng was whether the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits the
government from permitting timber
harvesting in a national forest that had
traditionally been used by members of
American Indian tribes for religious
purposes. The answer is no, essentially
because the government's program was
neutral and merely had an incidental
effect on the tribes' religious experience
with no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51, 108
S.Ct. 1319; . . . This is different from
being directly disabled from participating
in a government program on the basis of
religion, a question that was addressed
and resolved in McDaniel and
Rosenberger.
It is also the case that here, like McDaniel
and unlike Rust, Regan or Lyng, the
classification is coercive. Grantees in the
Rust line of cases could have their cake
and eat it, too; that is, they could accept
the grant and use it for the program's
restricted purpose, yet remain free to tap
non-government resources for
non-favored activities which could then
be conducted independently. Davey
cannot. If he accepts the Scholarship, he
may not pursue a degree in theology
(whether or not he has non-government
funds to do so). If he pursues a degree in
theology, he gets no Scholarship....
In sum, Wash. Rev.Code § 28B.10.814
and HECB's policy on their face
discriminate based on religious pursuit.
That the effect of the classification is not
to underwrite Davey's education because
it includes a degree in theology does not
make the classification less of a
discrimination on account of viewpoint.
This is not a case where a person claims
that denial of a financial benefit which is
not available to others deprives him of his
free exercise rights. Davey was denied a
Promise Scholarship to which he was
otherwise entitled solely because he
personally chose to pursue a religious
major. For this reason we must strictly
scrutinize the restriction. See McDaniel,
435 U.S. at 628, 98 S.Ct. 1322; Lukumi,
508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217.
B
HECB contends that even if, contrary to
its view, a compelling interest is required,
Washington's interest in not violating its
own law suffices. In support, it notes that
the Washington Supreme Court, and the
highest courts of other states, have relied
on the establishment clause in their state
constitutions to reject claims that a bar on
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funding religious exercise violates the
First Amendment.
In particular, HECB points out that the
Washington Supreme Court rejected a
free exercise claim quite similar to
Davey's in Witters v. State Comm'n for
the Blind (Witters III), 112 Wash.2d 363,
771 P.2d 1119 (1989) . . . . The Witters
litigation involved a decision by the
Washington Commission for the Blind to
deny vocational rehabilitation assistance
to a blind person who was studying at a
Christian college and seeking to become
a pastor. The Commission's decision was
based on the Washington constitutional
prohibition on use of public funds to
assist an individual in the pursuit of a
career or degree in theology. It was
upheld by the Washington Supreme
Court, Witters v. State Comm'n for the
Blind (Witters I), 102 Wash.2d 624, 689
P.2d 53 (1984), but the United States
Supreme Court held that extension of aid
to finance a person's training at a
Christian college did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court left it to the
state court to consider the dictates of the
Washington Constitution, which Witters I
had characterized as "far stricter" than the
federal analogue, and the Court declined
to "leapfrog" consideration of those
issues by holding that the Free Exercise
Clause requires Washington to extend aid
regardless of what the state constitution
commands. Witters II, 474 U.S. at 489.
On remand, the Washington Supreme
Court held that extending aid would
violate the Washington Constitution's
prohibition on appropriating and
applying public funds to religious
instruction, and would not infringe the
applicant's right to the free exercise of
religion. Davey questions whether this
continues to be good law, as the state
supreme court has since relied on the
dissent in Witters III in upholding state
funding for religious worship so long as it
passes through private hands first.
Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash.2d
779, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997). However,
we assume that the Washington Supreme
Court's view of the Washington
establishment clause is less
accommodating than the United States
Supreme Court's view of the federal
Establishment Clause. The real issue is
whether that interest, no matter how
stringently construed, is compelling
enough to outweigh a credible free
exercise challenge under the federal
Constitution.
Following the Supreme Court's lead in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276,
102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981), we
indicated in Kreisner v. City ofSan Diego,
1 F.3d 775, 779 n. 2 (9th Cir.1993), that a
state's broader prohibition on
governmental establishment of religion is
limited by the Free Exercise Clause of the
federal constitution.... In this
constitutional context, we are unable to
recognize the State's interest as
sufficiently 'compelling' to justify
content-based discrimination against
respondents' religious speech." Widmar,
454 U.S. at 276, 102 S.Ct. 269. ...
We have concluded that in this case there
is a free exercise problem. This leaves us
with Washington's indisputably strong
interest in not appropriating or applying
money to religious instruction as
mandated by its constitution, and Davey's
interest in a Scholarship to which he was
entitled based on the objective criteria the
state set for qualification - but from
which he was disabled based on his being
a theology major. We believe that
Washington's interest in this case is less
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than compelling. The Promise
Scholarship is a secular program that
rewards superior achievement by high
school students who meet objective
criteria. It is awarded to students; no
state money goes directly to any sectarian
school. Scholarship funds would not even
go indirectly to sectarian schools or for
non-secular study unless an individual
recipient were to make the personal
choice to major in a subject taught from a
religious perspective, and then only to the
extent that the proceeds are used for
tuition and are somehow allocable to the
religious major. See Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153
L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (emphasizing
importance of neutrality and individual
choice in upholding voucher program).
The proceeds (approximately $1,500 in
Davey's year) may be used for any
education-related expense, including
food and housing; application to religious
instruction is remote at best. HECB does
not argue otherwise. In these
circumstances it is difficult to see how
any reasonably objective observer could
believe that the state was applying state
funds to religious instruction or to
support any religious establishment by
allowing an otherwise qualified recipient
to keep his Scholarship.
We hold that HECB's policy denying a
Promise Scholarship to a student
otherwise qualified for it according to
objective criteria solely because the
student decides to pursue a degree in
theology from a religious perspective
infringes his right to the free exercise of
his religion. As the Court recently
reiterated, the "guarantee of neutrality is
respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria
and evenhanded policies, extends
benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones,
are broad and diverse." Good News Club,
533 U.S. at 114, 121 S.Ct. 2093 (quoting
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839, 115 S.Ct.
2510).
Therefore, the criterion that conditions
receipt of the Promise Scholarship on the
recipient's not pursuing a degree in
theology taught from a religious
perspective must be stricken. HECB may
not rely on Wash. Rev.Code §
28B.10.814 because its classification
based on religion is unconstitutional as
applied through HECB's policy to Davey.
Nor does the establishment clause in
Washington's Constitution excuse
HECB's disabling Davey from receipt of
the Promise Scholarship to which he was
otherwise entitled under the program's
objective criteria solely on account of his
personal decision to pursue a degree in
theology.
REVERSED.
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority suggests that we begin with
first principles, and I do as well....
Specifically, I refer to that original
provision of the state's 1889 constitution
which provides that "No money or
property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment." Wash. Const.
art. I,§ 11.
The simple truth is that Washington has
neither prohibited nor impaired Davey's
free exercise of his religion. He is free to
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believe and practice his religion without
restriction. Nor has the state prohibited
Davey from exercising his right to choose
among the full gamut of academic
pursuits offered by Northwest College.
In fact, Davey is still pursuing the same
pastoral studies degree today that he
claims the state prohibited him from
pursuing three years ago. The only state
action here was a decision consonant
with the state constitution, not funding
"religious ... instruction."
I see the question as being whether the
State of Washington may constitutionally
decline to fund pastoral studies as part of
its Promise Scholarship. Likewise, I see
the analysis as following the framework
of the question. This is a funding case,
not a free exercise case or a free speech
case. The State of Washington, based on
its constitution, made a straightforward
decision not to fund a degree in pastoral
studies. In other words, in an effort to
maintain the separation between church
and state, the state decided that it has no
obligation to financially support a student
to become a minister. Because I
conclude, unlike the majority, that the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the
abortion funding cases guides our
decision here, I respectfully dissent.
I
Before addressing the funding cases, I
must first disagree with Davey that the
Supreme Court's free exercise
jurisprudence gives us sufficient
guidance to warrant a decision in his
favor.
Davey relies primarily on the Court's
decisions in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, (1993) and McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, (1978), to argue that the State's
decision not to fund religious activities
impermissibly discriminates against him
by (1) "singling out" students who would
otherwise pursue a theology degree; and
(2) forcing them to make the difficult
decision of choosing to accept funding at
the expense of foregoing religious study
for the first two years of post-secondary
education. Those decisions simply do
not support this conclusion.
Neither Davey nor the majority seriously
contends that either Section 11 of the
Washington State Constitution or Wash.
Rev.Code § 28B.10.814 was intended to
suppress religion. And, because Davey
was still able to pursue his chosen major
in the absence of funding, he would be
hard- pressed to argue that either of these
provisions has the unintended effect of
suppressing his religious exercise.
Nevertheless, Davey argues, and the
majority agrees, that the state's funding
scheme imposes an unconstitutional
condition upon its acceptance. They cite
the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct.
1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978), which in
turns finds support in the Court's earlier
decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965
(1963). Although the majority extracts
from these decisions the general
proposition that a state may not offer a
benefit to all to the exclusion of others on
the basis of religion, neither McDaniel
nor Sherbert supports such a broad
prohibition on government action as to
encompass its funding decisions for
purposes of higher education.
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Unlike McDaniel, this case does not
juxtapose two fundamental rights. We
are not talking about some constitutional
right to educational funding (which,
incidentally, there is not, see San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
35, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973));
rather, we are talking about the
"privation" of a scholarship - one which
Davey apparently did not need, although
he obviously would have appreciated, to
pursue his desired major.
II
In my view, the abortion funding cases
provide the closest analog to Davey's
case. Davey has a
constitutionally-protected right to
exercise his religious beliefs, including a
decision to be a pastoral studies major,
but the state has no obligation to fund that
religious pursuit, even when it has chosen
to fund other educational pursuits.
Likewise, a woman has a
constitutionally- protected right to an
abortion, but the state has no obligation to
fund that right, even when it has chosen
to fund other medical procedures....
Much as the government may not
"prohibit" or otherwise "substantially
burden" the free exercise of religion
without violating the Constitution, the
Court has similarly characterized the
right to abortion when it held that the
Constitution "protects the woman from
unduly burdensome interference with her
freedom to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 473-74, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d
484 (1977).
Significantly, for purposes of comparison
to our case, the Court has held that the
express denial of funding by a state for
abortions does not so burden that right -
even when the individual is indigent or
otherwise qualified for medical benefits:
The [state regulation prohibiting abortion
funding] places no obstacles absolute or
otherwise in the pregnant woman's path
to an abortion. An indigent woman who
desires an abortion suffers no
disadvantage as a consequence of [the
state's] decision to fund childbirth; she
continues as before to be dependent on
private sources for the service she desires.
The State may have made childbirth a
more attractive alternative, thereby
influencing the woman's decision, but it
has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult
and in some cases, perhaps, impossible
for some women to have abortions is
neither created nor in any way affected
by the [state's] regulation.
Id. at 474, 97 S.Ct. 2376 (emphasis
added); see also Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 316, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65
L.Ed.2d 784 (1980) (no unconstitutional
burden even when woman would
terminate pregnancy for health reasons).
I can discern no difference here. In
Davey's case, the State of Washington
may have made the pursuit of a
non-theology degree more attractive by
virtue of the scholarship award, but at the
same time has not "burdened" Davey by
making the pursuit of his chosen degree
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any more difficult than it would have
been in the absence of this funding.
Consequently, no less than "the
constitutional freedom recognized in
[Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705,
35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973),] and its progeny,"
the freedom to exercise one's religion
should not "prevent [Washington] from
making a value judgment favoring [the
funding of non-theology degrees] over
[theology degrees], and ... implement[ing]
that judgment by the allocation of public
funds." Harris, 448 U.S. at 314, 100 S.Ct.
2671 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
the government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N. Y State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501,
116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991). Thus, the
argument can at least be made, as it was
in Rosenberger, that the failure to fund a
religious publication might
impermissibly limit students' access to a
full panoply of intellectual perspectives,
an important concern in the university
setting... .But to extend this argument to
the failure to fund Davey's pursuit of a
theology degree would stretch the
view-point rationale to the breaking point
of credulity.
III
As I have noted, Davey and the majority
take a decidedly different tack as they
race around the free exercise
jurisprudence to the seemingly safe
harbors of Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995),
and the free speech cases. Whatever
nirvana the expansive public forum
doctrine may seem to provide, it cannot
be stretched to cover Davey's claims. As
attractive as Rosenberger may be insofar
as it involves funding decisions in an
educational setting, Davey's is not a free
speech case, or at least has not been
treated (and in my view, correctly so) as
such by the majority. More explicitly,
the decision not to fund Davey's pursuit
of a pastoral ministry degree does not
implicate the free speech viewpoint
concerns that drove the Court's decision
in Rosenberger.
The underlying rationale for the general
prohibition on content discrimination is
the concern that it "raises the specter that
IV
In the Court's most recent
pronouncement in the religion arena,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct.
2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002), Justice
Thomas specially concurred to express
his opinion that "state action should be
evaluated on different terms [in the
context of the Establishment Clause] than
similar action by the Federal
Government," concluding that federal
courts should "strike a proper balance
between the demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the one hand and the
federalism prerogatives of States on the
other." Id., 122 S.Ct. at 2481 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Concededly, Justice
Thomas was suggesting that states should
be allowed more constitutional freedom
to experiment with involvement in
religion, id, but I cannot conclude that
such federalism concerns should
represent a one-way street when it comes
time for a state to decide whether to enter
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into the ill-defined terrain of the
Establishment Clause's jurisprudence.
No less than the State of Ohio's decision
to fund students' sectarian education,
which the Court endorsed in Zelman, the
State of Washington's decision not to
"experiment" in the funding of religious
indoctrination should represent an
equally valid concern - both as a matter
of federalism and with respect to the
more explicit limitations of the Religion
Clauses. Thus, in the absence of a more
substantial burden than this decision has
placed on Davey's choice of study, I
conclude that Washington has
successfully navigated the tensions
between the free exercise of religion and
the prohibition of its endorsement when,
at the time of statehood, it decided to
refrain from funding religious instruction,
I therefore respectfully dissent.
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Justices to Hear Religious Rights Case
Seattle Times
May 20, 2003
Robert Marshall Wells and Janet I. Tu
Joshua Davey of Spokane never thought
his case would play out on a national
stage.
But yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court
said it would weigh in on the matter of
using government money to help a
student become a religious leader. Davey
sued the state in 2000 when it rescinded a
grant to help pay his tuition at private
Northwest College in Kirkland, where he
studied theology.
The case puts the Supreme Court back
into the debate over the separation of
church and state. Last year, the court
ruled 5-4 in an Ohio case that
government vouchers are constitutional if
they provide parents with choices among
a range of religious and secular
schools.
Davey, who graduated from Northwest
College earlier this month, said he hopes
his case will help other students in similar
situations.
"To me, it's a form of discrimination
because I wanted to study certain subject
matter," Davey, 23, said yesterday from
his home in Spokane. "It was really more
about the principle than the money."
Davey started attending Northwest
college, which is affiliated with the
Assemblies of God, in 1999 with plans
to become a minister. The state initially
granted him a $1,125 Promise
Scholarship, given to low- to
middle-income students with good
grades. But the state later rescinded the
scholarship on the grounds it violated the
state's constitutional prohibition
regarding the separation of church and
state. Washington is one of 15 states that
bans state spending for theology classes.
In 2000, Davey filed suit in federal
district court, which ruled in the state's
favor.
But in a 2-1 decision by a three-judge
panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, the state's scholarship criteria
were ruled discriminatory on the basis
that they effectively suppressed
"religious points of view" and violated
the First Amendment's guarantee of free
exercise of religion and the 14th
Amendment's equal-protection clause.
The state appealed the 9th Circuit opinion,
prompting the Supreme Court to
announce yesterday that it will hear the
case, Locke v. Davey, later this year.
The case is likely to be heard in
December. But the court is unlikely to
release its final decision before June 2004.
The court typically releases opinions
after adjourning for the year.
The state, meanwhile, modified its
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policies earlier this year to comply with
the 9th Circuit decision in Davey's favor,
said Kris Betker of the Washington
Higher Education Coordinating Board,
which is responsible for overseeing
state-funded college-aid programs. The
change in policy, retroactive to last fall,
will remain in effect until the case is
decided.
Bill Collins, a Washington assistant
attorney general, contends the Davey
case is really about funding, not whether
the state violates students' constitutional
rights to freedom of religion.
"The only thing that we've declined to do
is pay for (Davey's) theology degree,"
Collins said. "Deciding not to fund a
constitutional right does not violate a
constitutional right."
Davey's lawyers argue otherwise. Stuart
Roth, senior counsel for the American
Center for Law and Justice, a
Virginia-based public- interest law firm
founded by televangelist Pat Robertson,
said Washington's policy unfairly
infringes on students' constitutional
rights to religious freedom.
"It targets people of religious expression
for discrimination," Roth said. "I think
this case does have national impact."
The Rev. Stephen Sundborg, a Jesuit and
president of Seattle University, agrees
with the ban on state taxpayer money
going to a person preparing to serve a
particular religious community or
denomination.
In essence, state-funded scholarship
money for people training to go into
ministry would amount to taxpayers'
money benefiting that particular religious
community, Sundborg said.
"If someone is studying for ministry in
the Baptist Church, or the Catholic
Church, or whatever church, the state
would be, in effect, providing money to
help in the development of that church,"
Sundborg said. "That's where the line
needs to be drawn."
Seattle University does not provide state
taxpayer-funded scholarships for
students majoring in theology or
preparing for ministry.
Sundborg acknowledges there is a
difference between those majoring in
theology in preparation for ministry, and
those doing so to increase their general
knowledge.
But "I err toward it being better to keep
the separation of church and state, than if
there's a lack of clarity," he said.
Howard Wilson, vice president of student
life and enrollment services at Pasadena's
Fuller Theological Seminary, which has
an extension campus in Seattle, sees
things differently.
A ban on taxpayer money going to fund
scholarships for college students
majoring in theology "discriminates
because it says a person who's going to
become a doctor has more to contribute
than a person who's going to become a
pastor," Wilson said. "To discriminate
against one profession over all others is
not equitable."
Wilson also said while some states
withhold funding, federal guaranteed
student loans and federal grants are
available as scholarships for many
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students who major in theology.
"The states have been discriminating
against religious education in a way that
the federal government has not," he said.
Davey, whose Promise Scholarship funds
have remained in escrow since 1999 until
the case is decided, has since decided not
to become a minister.
At least partially because of the lawsuit,
Davey said he's decided instead to pursue
a legal career. This fall, he will enter
Harvard University as a first-year law
student.
"I'm very excited," said Davey. "It's
obviously very exciting to be part of a
Supreme Court case."
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Justices Again Asked to Draw Church-State Line
Los Angeles Times
May 19, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- If states pay for
scholarships, textbooks and other types
of aid that benefit private secular schools,
does the U.S. Constitution require them
to do the same for church-related or
religious schools?
That question is before the Supreme
Court in the latest twist in the long debate
over religion and its relationship with the
government.
Last year, the high court said states may
use taxpayers' money to pay for children
to go to church-related schools. The 5-4
ruling upheld a voucher program in Ohio
that gives low-income parents a stipend
that they can use to send their child to a
church-related school. The flow of public
money to a parochial school did not
violate the 1st Amendment's ban on an
"establishment of religion," the court
ruled.
Now, religious-rights advocates and
voucher proponents are urging the
justices to go a step further and rule that if
states are supporting nonreligious private
schools through scholarships, tuition aid
or other means, they must also cover
costs for those at religious schools.
The justices met last week to consider
raising the issue and are likely to
announce today whether they will hear
the appeal.
To single out religious schools for
exclusion violates the Ist Amendment's
ban on the "free exercise of religion,"
religious rights lawyers say.
This claim runs squarely into the
constitutions in 36 states, including
California, that specifically forbid the use
of public money for "sectarian" schools.
In the past, the California courts have
struck down state programs that gave
textbooks to students attending parochial
schools on the grounds that the aid for
religious instruction violated the state
constitution.
But last year, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, suggested
that these state restrictions on public aid
for religious schools violate the 1st
Amendment's guarantee of "free
exercise" of religion.
Voucher advocates say striking down
these bans will remove a legal barrier to
statewide "school choice" programs that
support students who go to religious
schools.
UC Berkeley law professor Jesse H.
Choper, an expert on the religious clauses
of the Constitution, said the justices have
not interpreted the guarantee of "free
exercise" of religion as a guarantee of
public support for religion. "It would be a
big step" if they did, he said.
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Moreover, such a ruling could boost
President Bush's "faith-based initiative."
Bush has argued that when the
government provides social support
services -- whether for prisoners, drug
addicts, alcoholics or pregnant teenagers
-- it should include churches and
faith-based programs.
The case arose in 1999, when the
Legislature in Washington state offered
"Promise Scholarships" to top high
school graduates from low-income
families.
Joshua Davey qualified for a scholarship
and said he planned to study "pastoral
ministries" at a small college run by the
Assemblies of God. His aim was to
become a minister, he said.
State officials, pointing to Washington's
Constitution, said students studying
theology did not qualify for this public
aid.
"Absolute freedom of conscience in all
matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every
individual," it says. However, "no public
money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction."
Lawyers for the American Center on Law
& Justice, a conservative religious- rights
group based in Virginia Beach, Va., sued
in federal court on Davey's behalf.
While a judge in Seattle sided with the
state, the 9th Circuit in San Francisco
ruled for Davey.
The state's funding law "discriminates on
the basis of religion" and violates the U.S.
Constitution, said Judge Pamela Ann
Rymer, an appointee of the elder
President Bush.
The ruling came a month after the
Supreme Court upheld the vouchers
program in Ohio.
In dissent, Judge M. Margaret McKeown,
an appointee of President Clinton, said
the 1st Amendment's guarantee of "free
exercise" of religion means the
government may not "suppress religion,"
but need not support it either.
In February, Washington Gov. Gary
Locke appealed the issue to the U.S.
Supreme Court, asking whether the
Constitution "requires the state to fund
religious instruction."
"This poses a classic conflict for us," said
assistant state Atty. Gen. William B.
Collins.
While the Washington Supreme Court
has said the state may not give public
money to students to study religion, the
9th Circuit says the state must do so. If
the justices reject the appeal in Locke vs.
Davey, the 9th Circuit's ruling will stand
as the law in the Western states, including
California.
Lawyers for the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty and the Institute for
Justice, a libertarian group that has
championed vouchers, hope the court
will take the case and issue a ruling that
voids the state constitutional bans on aid
for religion.
These bans are "the remnants of 19th
century religious bigotry ... and should be
nullified," said Kevin Hasson, president
of the Becket Fund.
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In his view -- and that of several Supreme
Court justices -- these state bans are the
legacy of a largely forgotten but ugly
chapter in American history.
In the late 19th century, James G. Blaine,
the speaker of the House and a
Republican presidential candidate, led a
movement to bar the use of public money
to support Catholic schools. "The public
schools had a distinctly Protestant
character. That's why a parallel, parochial
system of Catholic schools developed,"
says Richard D. Komer, a lawyer for the
Institute of Justice. Blaine was "riding an
anti-Catholic animus."
Blaine's failed presidential campaign of
1884 is remembered by historians for a
supporter's claim that the Democrats
were the party of "rum, Romanism and
rebellion."
While Blaine's proposed federal
constitutional amendment fell just short
in Congress, 36 states adopted a version
for their state constitutions. Until recently,
these measures were seen as upholding
the principle of separation of church and
state.
But two years ago, U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas denounced
these state amendments as having a
"shameful pedigree" of anti-Catholic
"bigotry."
His opinion was joined by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.
Voucher advocates hope one more justice
will join them to rule for Joshua Davey.
"This could be a huge decision for the
school choice movement," says Clint
Bolick of the Institute for Justice, which
represented families in the Ohio voucher
case. "In one fell swoop, we could clear
away the remaining obstacle to school
choice programs in many of the states."
By coincidence, the high court had three
other religion appeals before it last week
-- two from California and one from Utah.
The city of Burbank is challenging a
California court ruling that barred
references to "Jesus Christ" in the
invocation at City Council meetings.
In 1953, the Burbank Ministerial Assn.
began providing a volunteer cleric to give
an invocation at the meetings. In
November 1999, a local Mormon bishop
offered his invocation "in the name of
Jesus Christ."
In the audience that day was Irv Rubin,
chairman of the Jewish Defense League,
and he sued, along with a group known as
the Council for Secular Humanism.
A Superior Court in Los Angeles and a
state appellate court agreed that this
"sectarian prayer" violated the 1st
Amendment's ban on an "establishment
of religion."
In March, Burbank's lawyers, joined by
80 municipalities in California, appealed.
(Burbank vs. Rubin) They noted that 20
years ago, the high court upheld a state
legislature's use of a chaplain, saying that
this was different from a prayer in a
public school. Burbank's lawyers urged
the high court to rule that "an occasional
sectarian prayer by a citizen volunteer at
a public meeting of a legislative body"
does not violate the I st Amendment.
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SUPREME COURT AGREES TO DECIDE IF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM CAN
EXCLUDE THEOLOGY STUDENTS
Oakstone Legal & Business Publishing, Inc.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently
announced that had accepted Washington
state's appeal of a 9th Circuit decision
that relied on Zelman v. Simmons- Harris,
122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002), and other recent
Supreme Court cases in striking down a
part of Washington's "promise
scholarship" program that provided state
funded scholarships for qualified college
students but excluded those "pursuing a
degree in theology."
In the last few years, the court has agreed
to decide several cases regarding the
extent to which state funding can be used
to benefit religious schools or students
who attend such schools.
The state-funded promise scholarship
program, created under Wash. Rev. Code
§ 28B.10.814, offered money to students
who maintained high grades, met family
income limits and agreed to attend an
accredited college in Washington. The
law and its regulations prohibited
students who pursued theology degrees
from receiving any financial aid under
the program. A student who met the
program's qualifications and was
awarded a scholarship enrolled in at
Northwest College, an accredited,
church-affiliated institution that educated
students from a "distinctly Christian
point of view" and required students to
indicate "a personal commitment to Jesus
Christ as Lord and Savior." The student
declared a double major in pastoral
ministries and business administration.
The state agency responsible for
administering the scholarship program
notified financial aid administrators
throughout Washington that students
pursuing theology degrees were
ineligible for promise scholarships.
Northwest College determined that
pastoral ministries majors were "pursuing
a degree in theology," requiring the
student to either forgo the scholarship or
change his major.
He turned down the scholarship and
commenced a federal district court action
against Washington state officials to
enjoin them from not awarding promise
scholarships to otherwise qualified
individuals solely because of their pursuit
of theology degrees. The District Court
granted summary judgment to the state
officials, and the student appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.
On appeal, the student argued that the
exclusion violated his religious free
exercise rights by singling him out for
unfavorable treatment because of his
choice of a religious major. The court
said that under Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of University of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819 (1995), once the state
decided to provide the scholarships to
students who met objective criteria, it had
to make them available on a
viewpoint-neutral basis.
The Supreme Court has stated that the
Free Exercise Clause protects against
discrimination against "some or all
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religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits
conduct because it is taken for religious
reasons." Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). Moreover, the Free Exercise
Clause "protects religious observers
against unequal treatment," and any law
burdening religious practices is subject to
the highest judicial scrutiny.
The 9th Circuit found that the state law
and regulations creating the scholarship
program implicated student free exercise
interests, since they plainly referred to
religion. The program disqualified only
students who pursued theology degrees
and, therefore, lacked neutrality.
The circuit court rejected the state's
argument that the student was not
precluded from seeking a theology
degree but only from obtaining state
funds for this degree. It held that a state
may not offer benefits to all applicants
but exclude some on the basis of religion.
Even though the student was not forced
to give up his religious calling, the state
could not condition the program on
giving up his pursuit of a religious degree.
The law creating the program was
viewpoint-based, and though the program
it created had a neutral purpose, it
discriminated against religious ideas. The
exclusion of theology majors
communicated disfavor and
discriminated against the distribution of
benefits in a way that suppressed a
religious point of view. The state policy
discriminated against religion and was
coercive, creating a classification based
on religious pursuit. The state argued that
the Washington Supreme Court has
construed the state constitution's
Establishment Clause more strictly than
the federal courts have construed the
Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
According to the state, the Washington
Supreme Court rejected a similar free-
exercise claim in Witters v. State
Commission for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119
(Wash. 1989), a decision which held that
providing state aid to a religious school
student violated the Washington
Constitution's strict prohibition on the
appropriation of public funds for
religious instruction. The circuit court
disagreed, saying the state's interest in
avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation was not compelling enough to
justify content- based discrimination
against religion.
Applying reasoning from the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Zelman, the
9th Circuit noted that promise
scholarships were awarded to students,
not institutions. No scholarship funds
went to sectarian schools unless an
individual recipient made the personal
choice to major in theology.
The circuit court struck down the
exclusion of theology students from the
program and reversed the judgment.
Davey v. Locke et al., No. 00-35962,
2002 WL 1578831 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Supreme Court will hear oral
arguments during the 2003-2004 term,
which will begin this fall, and a decision
will be issued sometime before the end of
the term in June 2004.
Locke et al. v. Davey, No. 02-1315, cert.
granted (U.S. 2003).
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Court Weighing Rights of States to Curb Aid for Religion Majors
The New York Times
August 10, 2003
By Adam Liptak
Teresa Becker made a costly decision when
she chose after her sophomore year to major
in theology
She had received $1,200 in state scholarship
money for her freshman year at Ave Maria
College in Ypsilanti, Mich., in 2000. The
next year she received $2,750 in state aid.
Last June, she was promised that amount for
her junior year, too.
A month later, when word of her choice of a
major reached state officials, they wrote her a
new letter.
"Students enrolled in a course of study
leading to a degree in theology, divinity or
religious education are not eligible to receive
an award," it said, paraphrasing a state law.
"Your award has changed from $2,750.00 to
$0.00."'
Ms. Becker sued. On July 21, Judge George
Caram Steeh of Federal District Court in
Detroit issued a preliminary ruling in her
favor, saying the state had probably engaged
in religious discrimination. Judge Steeh
ordered the state to put her scholarship
money in escrow until there is a final court
ruling.
A case much like Ms. Becker's from
Washington State will be decided by the
United States Supreme Court in its next term.
A trial in Ms. Becker's case has not been
scheduled and may never be needed; the
Supreme Court case will probably effectively
decide hers as well.
Eleven states prohibit aid for the study of
theology. In addition to Michigan and
Washington, they are New York, New Jersey,
Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota and Wisconsin,
according to a supporting brief filed in the
Supreme Court by five state attorneys
general.
The Washington case is in some ways the
narrower one. The State Supreme Court
interpreted theology to mean "instruction that
resembles worship and manifests a devotion
to religion and religious principles in thought,
feeling, belief and conduct."
In Washington, then, teaching about religion
as an academic subject, as opposed to
religious teaching meant to inspire devotion,
is fine.
The Michigan law is seemingly broader, and
its original purpose is not well understood. In
e-mail to an Ave Maria College official in
January, the director of the state's scholarship
office, Diana Todd Sprague, wrote: "I am not
clear on why this was part of the statute since
it was established in the 60's. It has been
described to me as having to do with the
separation of church and state, but I am not
certain."
Jason Allen, a Republican state senator from
here, called the history of the law murky.
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Senator Allen has introduced legislation to
allow state aid for students studying theology.
Ronald Muller, the president of Ave Maria
College, a Roman Catholic college, said its
theology major is part of its liberal arts
curriculum.
Theology "is an academic discipline like
philosophy, English literature or the
classics," he said.
Barry Lynn, the executive director of
Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, which opposes state financing for
most religious education, said the Michigan
statute might be too sweeping.
"The statute should probably read that
persons preparing for the ministry or
religious education are excluded," Mr. Lynn
said.
The plaintiff in the Washington case, Joshua
Davey, acknowledged that he is preparing for
a career as a Christian minister. Ms. Becker,
on the other hand, says she does not know
what career she will choose.
"I am not seriously considering any sort of
religious life," she said in an interview at her
parents' home here. But she said that her
interest in theology is not only academic.
"I selected theology as my undergraduate
major," she wrote in court papers, "based on
my sincere religious conviction that this
course of study will help me pursue my
vocation in life, to know, love and serve God
and my fellow men."
Ms. Becker, 21, is spending the summer in
this resort town where she grew up, on the
shore of Lake Michigan. She is direct and
serious, and she talked about the central role
her Catholic faith plays in her life.
"I was raised in it," she said. "I love it. It
influences how I act around others, how I
treat others. It's my salvation."
She is working at a doctor's office to make up
for the loss of state aid, and she volunteers
with the local anti-abortion advocacy group.
In the fall, she will start her senior year. She
said she has heard nothing from the state
about a fourth year of aid.
Ms. Becker said the scholarship law might
have discouraged some of her fellow students
at Ave Maria from choosing theology as their
majors. That did not stop them, she said,
from taking theology classes.
In a brief to the Supreme Court, Mr. Davey's
lawyers said that having scholarship
decisions turn on a student's major is a little
odd.
A student "could take numerous theology
courses, paid for by state grants, so long as
his major was something else (like
psychology or math)," the lawyers wrote. But
a student who declares a theology major
would get no state money for an entire year
"even if the student takes nothing but
language, literature, philosophy and
science," they said.
Ms. Becker's lawyers at the Thomas More
Law Center, a conservative public interest
law firm in Ann Arbor, Mich., emphasized
what they called the unfairness of the
distinction the Michigan law draws.
"An atheist committed to scientific
materialism may study the Big Bang, the
laws governing the subsequent organization
of matter and, ultimately, the amphibian from
which man is said to have evolved -- all
without forfeiting his scholarship," they
wrote in court papers. "But Teresa must
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forfeit her scholarship if she wishes to
discuss the Uncaused Cause that created the
stuff of the Big Bang, and the notion that the
laws that govern creation are not merely
statistically improbable but so irreducibly
complex that the heavens proclaim the glory
of the Lord."
Aaron Caplan, a staff lawyer at the American
Civil Liberties Union in Washington State,
said that states should be free to decide what
kinds of study to support. They can, for
instance, offer scholarships for medical
school but not law school. And while court
decisions hold that states are free to offer
scholarships for religious study, Mr. Caplan
said, it does not follow that states should be
required to do so.
The Washington case and Ms. Becker's boil
down to one proposition, he said, "A state
may legally choose not to fund people's
religious education." Ms. Becker saw it
differently. The state is violating people's
rights to religious freedom," she said. Her
fellow students have expressed support.
"They're praying for me and rooting for me,"
she said.
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Robert W. Tuttle
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
Washington provides the best-known
example of a state with a still-robust
Separationist approach to these questions.
After the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 ruled
unanimously that the federal Establishment
Clause did not preclude the use, at a
beneficiary-selected Bible college, of state
200
vocational training funds for the blind, the
Washington Supreme Court held on remand
of the case that the state constitution's Blaine
Amendment nevertheless precluded such
use.201
In July of 2002, however, a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cast
doubt on the continued validity of
200 Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986).
201 Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d
1119 (1989). Article I, section 11 of the Washington
Constitution provides that "No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment." Wash. Const.
art 1, § 11. Washington appears to be a true
"separationist" state, holding religious institutions to
be constitutionally distinctive for purposes of both
benefits, see Witters, 771 P.2d at 1119, and burdens.
See First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174
(Wash. 1992). For further discussion of First
Covenant and its place in Separationist thinking, see
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 39.
Washington's Blaine Amendment, at least as
applied to a program of indirect funding. In
Davey v. Locke, the panel ruled two to one
that the state constitution could not justify the
exclusion, from the state-sponsored "Promise
Scholarship" program, of students majoring
in theology at private, religiously affiliated
schools. The program included students
majoring in other subjects at those schools,
and the panel opinion suggests that it
included as well those students studying
theology as part of a course of study at
state-run schools. The challenged exclusion,
the panel majority ruled, burdened the
students' rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the federal constitution, and the
state constitution applied to these facts did
not promote a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify the exclusion. Davey
involves a form of voucher program, and its
holding casts doubt on whether Blaine
Amendments can lawfully limit state
voucher programs to secular options without
running afoul of the federal Constitution. 204
202 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
204 Our own view of Davey v. Locke is that it is
correctly decided on equal protection and/or free
speech grounds, and that it's suggested sweeping
condemnation of Washington's Blaine Amendment is
too broad. Davey relied on Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City offHialeah, 508 US 520 (1993), to
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Several scholars have analyzed the federal
constitutional problem presented by
Washington and other states whose
constitutions, as construed, would impede
the inclusion of religious schools in any
voucher program that would result in a
transfer of state funds to private schools.
What has begun to pass for conventional
wisdom among these scholars goes
something like this: Blaine Amendments, so
construed, no longer have parallel
interpretations of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause for normative
reinforcement. By excluding religious
entities from aid that may go to secular
organizations, state law of this character: (1)
presumptively violates the equal protection
clause by using religion, an arguably suspect
classifying criterion, as a basis for excluding
some entities from aid; (2) offends free
exercise norms by singling out religious
associations for disfavored treatment; and (3)
independent of the first two arguments,
violates the Constitution because enactment
of the state provision was the product of
anti-Catholic animus.
hold that all discrimination against religion is
constitutionally suspect. That decision, however,
involved a coercive prohibition against a religious
practice, and a gerrymander of an ordinance aimed at
cruelty to animals, which was designed to impede the
rituals of one and only one sect. As we see the
problem in Davey, the vice of Washington's policy is
that it singled out a particular viewpoint concerning
religious studies and refused to fund it, while
financing other viewpoints about religious studies.
Whatever legitimate interest the state has in an
institutional church-state separation broader than that
required by federal law, that interest cannot justify the
viewpoint-based discrimination in which Washington
appears to have engaged. See Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 US. 819 (1995) (denial
of funding to religious student group was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
The first two of these theories may seem to
amount to one and the same thing, but they
turn out to be fetchingly different. The equal
protection argument is even-handed as
between religious and secular entities; if,
after all, "religion" is a generically suspect
classifying trait, it should be equally
suspicious if the state favors or disfavors
religious institutions. Under this theory of
equal protection, state law that disables only
religious institutions from receiving benefits
is presumptively unconstitutional, but state
policies that provide special
accommodations for religious causes and
institutions, and treat them more favorably
than their secular counterparts, are likewise
presumptively invalid.
Such a doctrine is in sharp tension with the
Supreme Court's invitation to legislatures in
Employment Division v. Smith207 to make
precisely such generic accommodations of
religion. Moreover, the anti-Blaine forces
tend to be protective of state-created
accommodations for religious institutions
and causes. Accordingly, their preferred
approach to the problem of discrimination
against religious entities rests on the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Its
premise is that the state may not generically
treat religious entities worse than secular
ones. To do so is, in free exercise terms, to
"burden" religious institutions by
disqualifying them from opportunities open
to analogous secular organizations. Those
who adopt this argument, as did the Ninth
Circuit panel in Davey v. Locke, presume
that all generic disfavoring of religious
entities is unconstitutional unless such
policies can satisfy strict judicial scrutiny--
i.e., unless the state can demonstrate that the
policy is narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest.
207 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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The Free Exercise Clause approach spares
religious accommodations from its wrath, but
it has a deep flaw of its own. American
constitutional law, federal and state, has for
many years done exactly what this argument
condemns. The law of the federal
Establishment Clause has been and continues
to be that the state may not make unrestricted,
direct transfers of funds to religious
organizations, because the principal activity
of such organizations--religious worship--is
something which the state may neither
regulate nor subsidize.212 Nor is this the only
constitutionally required exclusion of
religious organizations from a state
protection or benefit. The state operates
under religion-specific constitutional
limitations with respect to disputes, relating
to property or personnel, that are internal to
religious communities and organizations. 2 13
The state's obligation either to refrain from
intervening in such disputes, 214  or to
adjudicate them under principles that can be
applied without reference to religious
matters, 215 has costs as well as benefits for
religious communities. These limits on the
state reduce government interference in
religious affairs, but also deprive religious
factions of the opportunity for authoritative
dispute resolution by the state.
212 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1997).
213For discussion of relevant principles, see, for
example, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979);
Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 708-12 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969); Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929); and
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 702-13
(1871).
214 Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03.
The argument that Blaine Amendments are
presumptively unconstitutional because they
single out religious entities for special
treatment thus proves far too much. If the
line between religious and nonreligious
organizations is constitutionally suspect,
each and every religion-specific doctrine
under the federal religion clauses becomes
constitutionally doubtful as well. An
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
that casts doubt on many longstanding
constitutional norms seems questionable
indeed. 218
A narrower argument against the Blaine
Amendments that voucher proponents may
make would focus on the change in federal
Establishment Clause law represented by
recent cases, including Agostini v. Felton, 2 19
Mitchell v. Helms, and Zelman itself. The
premise of this theory is that states may
indeed treat religious institutions differently
from secular ones, but only to the extent that
federal constitutional law so requires. If this
were the law, states would be obliged to
ensure that they did not directly aid the
specifically religious activities of private
organizations, but states with voucher
programs could not rely on their Blaine
Amendments to exclude religious schools
because Zelman teaches that federal law does
not so require.
218 In reaching its conclusion that all discriminations
against religious entities are constitutionally suspect,
the Ninth Circuit panel in Davey v. Locke relied
heavily on McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
See Davey, 299 F.3d at 752-58. McDaniel invalidated
a state law prohibition on clergy serving as elected
representatives in state legislatures. Because the
restriction in McDaniel operated to coercively exclude
clergy from one aspect of the right of self-government,
the decision does not necessarily extend to state law
exclusions of religious entities from state largesse.
But the Ninth Circuit did not explore any such
distinction.
215 Id.
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This approach does not unravel existing
federal constitutional law, but it has strange
consequences in the federal system. States
would be free under this theory to construe
their Blaine Amendments in only one
way--to mirror whatever the U.S. Supreme
Court held at any given time was required by
the Establishment Clause. This leaves the
states no authority to have a non-
establishment policy broader than whatever
five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court find
to be the content of federal law at any given
moment. The upshot would be to deny the
states any room whatsoever for their own
church-state policy, even if that policy had
been federal constitutional law a few short
years ago. It is hard to imagine a doctrine
more hostile to notions of respect for state
law, and in particular to the tradition of
independent state constitutional law.
Although Justice Thomas of course was
imagining that states would be pro-religion
rather than the opposite, he urged in Zelman
that states be given room to fashion their own
church-state policies, and the campaign
against the Blaine Amendments threatens
state autonomy of precisely that character.
Sensitive to these considerations of
federalism, we believe that each state should
be free to make its own constitutional policy
of church-state relations, and to extend it
beyond the federal policy, so long as the state
approach serves reasonable purposes of the
sort associated with the regime of
Separationism. What is obvious, however, is
that those purposes need some restatement
and reinvigoration. As Separationism has
come under attack in recent years, its
defenders--the Zelman dissenters
prominently among them--have tended to
rely excessively on justifications now viewed
by many as outmoded. A result that four of
nine Justices vehemently favored in Zelman
may be constitutionally reasonable, but not
just because they so conclude. Whether
states can defend a Separationist policy
broader than the federal constitution requires
will thus depend on the efforts of judges and
academics to provide precisely this sort of
rehabilitation of the Separationist ethos.
Separationism aside, there is one stark way
for a state to reconcile a strenuous
Separationist policy with norms of equality,
from wherever they are drawn. Equality can
be achieved by equalizing down as well as up.
[Footnote omitted] States can
simultaneously comply with their Blaine
Amendments and norms of equality simply
by treating religious and nonreligious private
organizations alike, and excluding all from
the aid that the state constitution precludes
going to the religious entities. Such an
approach would entail, for example, a
school-choice program limited to public
schools only.
This strategy, however, cannot help the
broader voucher movement, with its
emphasis on maximizing parental choice in
ways that include private schools, religious
and otherwise. If courts permit the states to
maintain church-state policies more
Separationist than the federal constitution
requires, is the attempt to advance the school
voucher movement by ousting the Blaine
Amendments doomed to failure? Perhaps it
is not. We think there is one argument that
may yet push the attack on the Blaine
Amendments over the top, but it is the most
ornery and least generic of the arguments
frequently advanced against such
amendments. The anti-Catholic origins of at
least some of the Blaine Amendments may
be a powerful source of constitutional
condemnation. The argument is made yet
stronger--and the Supreme Court's
receptivity to it made more obvious--by the
view expressed in the plurality opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms that the judge-made
doctrine that excluded "pervasively
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sectarian" entities from government
assistance was a product of anti-Catholic
bigotry. 225 The underlying premise of the
Mitchell plurality is that the line of decisions
from Lemon to Aguilar, representing the
high water mark of Separationism, is itself
blemished by such prejudice. If it can be
proven that a particular state added a
Blaine-type Amendment, blocking all forms
of material transfer to religious institutions,
because of anti-Catholic sentiment, federal
constitutional law would likely support the
invalidation of such an amendment.
Several discrete lines of case law, under a
variety of constitutional provisions,
intertwine around this view. In Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that a city's
policy, ostensibly designed to protect a
religion-neutral concern for animal welfare,
had been gerrymandered for the purpose of
impeding animal sacrifice as practiced by a
particular sect, and therefore violated the
Free Exercise Clause unless it could meet the
requirements of strict constitutional scrutiny.
In Larson v. Valente, 227 the Court applied a
similar doctrine under the Establishment
Clause to a Minnesota statute, regulating
fund-raising practices, that the Court found
had been covertly designed to burden the
Unification Church and to leave untouched
the practices of mainstream faiths. If courts
take this approach in challenges to the
Blaines, the state is not likely to prevail; as
Davey v. Locke reveals, it will be very
difficult to show that a strict separationist
posture, now partly repudiated in federal law,
is narrowly tailored to compelling state
interests.
Away from the field of religion, the Equal
Protection Clause (and the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment) have been pressed into
similar service, but with significant doctrinal
differences from the religion clause cases just
described. In Washington v. Davis,22 9 the
Court held that covert unconstitutional
purposes--in that case, alleged racial
animosity--could render a race-neutral
scheme unconstitutional. In the Arlington
Heights decision,2 30 the Court clarified that
evidence of such purposes tainted a
government decision, but did not trigger
conventional strict scrutiny; instead, it
shifted the burden to the government to
demonstrate that it would have made the
same decision in the absence of the
impermissible motive. Perhaps the age of the
Blaine Amendments would make it unlikely
that states could carry such a burden, but this
approach leaves open a plausible way for the
state to preserve a Blaine Amendment even if
its past is tainted by sectarian hostility.
The legal setting of the Blaine Amendments
in state constitutions, rather than statutory
law, in no way immunizes them from claims
of unconstitutional motivation. In Hunter v.
Underwood,231  the Supreme Court
invalidated a provision of the Alabama
Constitution, disfranchising a very wide
group of persons who had been convicted of
a felony. The Court found indisputable
evidence that the backers of the provision
229 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
230 Arlington Heights v. Metro. House. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that
proof that the dismissal of government employee is
tainted by constitutionally impermissible reason shifts
burden to the state to show that the dismissal would
have occurred independent of that reason).
231 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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225 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
227 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
had been motivated by a desire to
disfranchise African-Americans. And, most
recently, the Court rendered its most
controversial invalidation of a state
constitutional amendment; in Romer v.
Evans, 232 it ruled that Colorado's attempt to
constitutionalize a prohibition on protecting
gays and lesbians from discrimination had
been motivated by a constitutionally
forbidden anti-homosexual animus.
If we are correct that the most persuasive
constitutional argument against Blaine
Amendments is that each may have been
motivated by anti-Catholic animus, the path
for those who are fighting for vouchers, and
against the Blaine Amendments, is twisted
and uphill. First, the fight must be won on
state-specific historical grounds in each and
every jurisdiction. Even if the case for
anti-Catholic animus as a motivating force is
supported by substantial historical evidence
in some states, the case may not be nearly so
easy to make in others. The problem of proof
may be especially acute with respect to states
in the West, where Congress frequently
required states newly entering the Union to
include a Blaine-type provision in their
constitutions as a condition of entry.234 In
232 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
234 Treenc, supra note 193, at 8-9. Even with respect to
those states in which the anti-Catholic case can be
made, it will depend entirely on constitutional history,
and statements from legislative debates. Of course,
some Justices (most notably Justice Scalia, whose vote
may well be necessary to form a majority in favor of
invalidating a Blaine Amendment in the Supreme
Court) are on record as being opposed to judicial
reliance on such evidence of covert motivation. See,
e.g., Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye v. City ofHialeah,
508 US. 520, 557-59 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 US. 578, 637-39 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). By the same token, will those
who normally are willing to consider such evidence,
but who dissented in Zelman, be willing to invalidate
Blaine Amendments, sect- neutral and separationist on
their face, when confronted with such evidence? The
ironies presented by the attack on the Blaine
such states, the legislature may never have
focused precisely on the content of the Blaine
Amendment, which arrived from Congress as
part of an aggregated bundle of constitutional
provisions. With respect to such states,
challengers may have to show that the
Congress(es) that required a Blaine
Amendment as a condition of entry into the
Union were moved by impermissible
hostility to the Roman Catholic Church.
Evidence of this may not be easy to find, and,
influenced by the decision in United States v.
O'Brien, courts may not be receptive in any
event to evidence of covert unconstitutional
motivation on the part of Congress.
Moreover, an animus-based theory of why a
Blaine Amendment is unconstitutional
invites the possibility of successful
contemporary reenactment. If Blaine
Amendments are generically
unconstitutional because they disfavor
religious entities, current enactment or
reenactment of such a restriction is
constitutionally doomed. If, however, a state
enacts one today in a climate that precludes
an inference that it has been motivated by
sectarian animus, it would stand on the same
footing as a nineteenth century enactment in
a state in which animus could not be proven.
This proposition is well illustrated by the
contrast between the Supreme Court's
decisions in Hunter v. Underwood 236 and
Richardson v. Ramirez.237 In the former, the
Court held unconstitutional a state
constitutional provision disfranchising all
persons convicted of crimes involving
Amendments are rich and thick, and uncertainty about
the outcome in the Supreme Court of an animus- based
challenge to a Blaine Amendment affects the overall
picture for the litigants.
236 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 222.
237 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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"moral turpitude," on the basis of evidence
that it had been motivated by a desire to
exclude African-Americans from the vote;23 8
in the latter, the Court upheld a California
provision disfranchising all convicted felons,
a restriction on voting that had not been
shown to be impermissibly motivated....
238 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227-33.
239 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54. One can imagine,
therefore, that invalidation of a Blaine Amendment
may lead to a political campaign to reenact some new
version of a comparable restriction on church-state
relations. Even if contemporary reenactment will
effectively reinstate a Blaine Amendment, however,
invalidation of the nineteenth century version will
place the burden of political inertia on the
anti-voucher forces rather than, as is currently the case,
on the pro-voucher forces who are leading the charge
against the Blaines. The invalidation of the anti-gay
amendment in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
could not similarly be overcome by re-enactment,
because the Court held that provision invalid on its
face rather than invalid solely because it had been
corrupted by covert, impermissible motivation.
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VOUCHERS AFTER ZELMAN
Supreme Court Review
2002
Mark Tushnet
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
A. EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS FROM PARTICIPATION:
THE "LITTLE BLAINE AMENDMENTS"
AND STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS
Zelman finds constitutional a voucher
program that allows vouchers to be used at
religiously affiliated schools. What of a
voucher program that does not? A state might
be barred by state constitutional law from
making vouchers available for use at such
schools, or its legislature might decide to
limit the scope of a voucher program to
secular private schools. Substantial federal
constitutional arguments can be raised
against either type of exclusion.
State legislatures and courts might find a
so-called Little Blaine Amendment to stand
in the way of including religiously affiliated
schools in voucher programs. In 1875
Republican Representative James M. Blaine
introduced a proposed constitutional
amendment that provided: "[N]o money
raised by taxation in any State for the support
of public schools ... shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect ...." The Senate
version provided: "No public property, and
no public revenue ... shall be appropriated to,
or made or used for, the support of any school,
educational or other institution, under the
control of any religious or anti-religious sect,
organization, or denomination .." Congress
did not submit the Blaine Amendment to the
states for ratification, but many states
incorporated its provisions into their own
constitutions. Advocates of including
religiously affiliated schools in voucher
programs would have to establish either that
the Little Blaine Amendments do not require
excluding such schools from those
programs--probably a difficult showing to
make--or that the Little Blaine Amendments
are themselves unconstitutional.
On their face, the Little Blaine
Amendments might seem no more than the
embedding into a state constitution of a
policy preference, where the losers happen to
be disproportionately adherents of religion
(or particular religions). And, as such, the
Little Blaine Amendments might be thought
unproblematic. Any state constitutional
amendment does what the Little Blaine
Amendments do, and Zelman's neutrality test
itself instructs us that the Establishment
Clause is not violated by a policy that simply
has a disproportionate impact on religious
believers.
There is, however, a fly in the ointment.
Otherwise acceptable policies might become
unacceptable if their adoption was
improperly motivated. And, as Justice
Thomas wrote in Mitchell v Helms, the
Blaine Amendment and its local variants
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have "a shameful pedigree," originating in
what we today understand to be simple
hostility to the Catholic Church. 52  Yet, it
seems puzzling that a shameful pedigree
alone is enough to find the Little Blaine
Amendments unconstitutional. The reason,
simply, is that the Little Blaine Amendments
are old. A bad motive might invalidate even
an old provision if the provision was put on
the books and maintained for bad reasons,
but why should a bad motive at the outset be
enough to overturn a policy that today might
be supported for perfectly acceptable
reasons?
One possibility is that there is an asymmetry
between enactment and repeal: Even if a lot
of people today reject the anti-Catholic views
that pervaded the movement to adopt the
Little Blaine Amendments, and have no
particular fondness for those amendments,
still the amendments might remain on the
books because a majority is indifferent to
their continued existence, at least in the sense
that the majority cares to devote its political
energy to matters it thinks more important.
One might call this a problem of selective
indifference, which signals the difficulty:
The Court has not accepted theories
according to which selective indifference is
52 530 US at 828. One might note that the Blaine
Amendment might have been motivated, not by
hostility to the religious dimensions of Catholicism,
but by concern about political aspects of Catholic
doctrine in the 1870s, which proponents of the
amendment believed had strongly antidemocratic
implications. I doubt that there could be a
constitutional objection to state policies, even
embedded in constitutional amendments, that do no
more than take off the agenda of ordinary politics
substantive policies that majorities believe to originate
in antidemocratic impulses, unless, as discussed below,
the policies enacted are objectionable on other
grounds--such as antireligious or other class-based
improper motivation, or where the policies themselves
deal with free expression.
enough to establish unconstitutionality.54
Even more, there is some precedent in the
Religion Clause context suggesting fairly
strongly that bad motivation at the outset can
become irrelevant over time, if eventually a
law can be justified by identifying some
permissible goals the legislature might be
pursuing (today) in keeping it on the books.
The bad motivations underlying the Little
Blaine Amendments therefore should be put
aside as we try to evaluate the argument that
those amendments are unconstitutional when
invoked to justify excluding religiously
affiliated schools from voucher programs. In
any event, the motives behind the Little
Blaine Amendments would not matter if,
instead of invoking a state constitutional
requirement, state legislators decided as a
matter of policy to exclude religiously
affiliated schools from voucher programs.
What might the federal constitutional
objection be to such an exclusion? 57
54For a discussion, see Geoffrey Stone et al,
Constitutional Law 528 (Aspen, 4th ed 2001)
(describing the problem of selective insensitivity).
Heytens, 86 Va L Rev at 153-60 (cited in note 53),
argues that exclusion of religiously affiliated schools
violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating
on the basis of religion, a suspect classification. See
also Lupu and Tuttle, 78 Notre Dame L Rev
(forth-coming) (cited in Author's Note), for a similar
argument. I believe the equal protection argument
works reasonably well where schools are excluded
from participation solely on the ground that they are
religiously affiliated, but less well where they are
excluded because their curricula have religious
content. To the extent that Little Blaine Amendments
bar states from making funds available to religiously
affiliated schools solely because of their affiliation
(and not because of the content of the instruction they
offer), the amendments might be inconsistent with the
principles of equal protection and free exercise
enforced in McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618 (1978).
(Marty Lederman pointed out to me the relevance of
the distinction between exclusion based on affiliation
and exclusion based on content.)
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Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia provides a substantial
basis for claiming that the exclusion of a
religiously affiliated school would violate its
right of free expression. Rosenberger
involved the distribution of money from a
fund made up of student activities fees at the
University of Virginia. The program's criteria
for distributing funds excluded from
participation groups that promoted religion.
The Court held that the exclusion violated
free expression principles. It began by
characterizing the fund as a limited public
forum. The public finances classic public
forums--streets and parks--and public forum
doctrine allows speakers to take advantage of
that public funding to support their own
speech. The fund in Rosenberger was a
limited public forum, the Court said, because
the university gave access to such a wide
range of speakers that no one could
reasonably believe that the funds were
supporting speech by the university itself
rather than speech by the private recipients.
The Court has held that government may not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in
making the public forum subsidy available.
And Rosenberger held that exclusion of
religious groups because they were religious
and sought to communicate their religion was
viewpoint- rather than content-based
discrimination.
Rosenberger seems directly applicable to
voucher programs.6 1 Like the fund in
61 But see Lupu and Tuttle, 78 Notre Dame L Rev
(forthcoming) (cited in Author's Note), arguing that
"the provision of public services--even if they have an
expressive component--is conceptually distinct from
the creation of a forum for debate. Unlike the context
of public fora, in which the state provides resources
for the very purpose of association and expression,
school choice programs have the narrower and more
focused purpose of delivering educational service to
the young in the community." I do not think that this
distinction can bear the weight Lupu and Tuttle place
on it: The distinction between providing resources for
association and expression and delivering educational
Rosenberger, voucher programs make public
money available to parents who can choose
to send their children to schools whose
curricula--their speech--range widely.
Zelman holds that the religious speech of
institutions to which parents send their
children in voucher programs that provide
"true choice" and neutrality cannot
reasonably be attributed to the state, just as
the religious speech in Rosenberger could not
reasonably be attributed to the university.
Rosenberger also emphasized that the case
did not involve direct aid to religious entities,
pointing out that the university's checks were
made out, not to the religious group, but to
the company that printed the group's
newspaper. The Chief Justice treated
Zelman as another case not involving direct
aid to religiously affiliated institutions.
Two distinctions might be drawn between
Rosenberger and voucher programs. First,
the former involves higher education, the
latter elementary and secondary education.
Perhaps the inference of government
endorsement is stronger with respect to what
is said in the wide range of elementary and
secondary schools participating in voucher
programs than it is with respect to public
universities. Precisely where one is to get
information about what people reasonably
believe is quite unclear. My own preference
would be to require the presentation of
evidence by those whose case turns on what
is essentially an empirical point--in this
context, those who would defend the
exclusion on the ground that a reasonable
observer might attribute religious speech at
an elementary school to the government. I
certainly have no strong intuitions about
what reasonable observers would infer, and
service is thin indeed. What else is education other
than association (socialization) and expression
(knowledge)?
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little confidence in the intuitions ofjudges on
that question.
Second, it might be said that the university
in Rosenberger asserted no interest in the
content of what was said by groups receiving
money from the fund (except that it did not
want them to engage in proselytizing speech,
or perhaps religious speech more broadly
understood), whereas the state does have an
interest in the content of what is taught in
schools receiving vouchers, as is shown by
the obvious constitutionality of requirements
that those schools teach English, algebra, and
other subjects. I question this distinction too.
The University of Virginia is, after all, an
educational institution, and I would think that
its governing board would take the position
that everything it uses its money for is part of
the university's educational mission. The
student activities fund, for example, allows
students to explore their own views through
publication, gain experience in disseminating
their views to a wide audience, and learn how
to run an organization. I would think, that is,
that the university would indeed assert that it
has an interest in the content of what is said
by groups receiving the funds, an interest,
that is, in ensuring that what is said fits the
university's pedagogical mission. The
difficulty in Rosenberger was not that the
university had no interest in the content of
what was said; it was that it implemented its
interest in a viewpoint-discriminatory
manner.
A related argument is this: The University
in Rosenberger was generally indifferent
about the content of what was said in the
limited public forum created by the students
activities fund, but restricted some speech
because of its viewpoint. In contrast,
governments operating voucher programs are
generally interested in the content of what the
money is used for, and as a result must use
content-based criteria for determining who
properly gets the money. In the words of two
defenders of voucher programs, the
government may have the right to insist that
"education funds are being spent to educate,
and that the public good is being well-served
through sound performance and
achievement .."
The interest in "sound performance and
achievement" might support a requirement
that students pass government-specified tests.
This general interest would not, however,
justify excluding religiously affiliated
schools. Perhaps one could contend that, for
example, instruction in religious doctrine
falls outside the scope of education (but does
instruction in creationism?). I doubt, though,
that the government interest in ensuring that
"education funds are being spent to educate"
is strong enough to justify supervision of
what happens during every moment of school
time to ensure that nothing other than
education, as defined by the government, is
occurring. That is, governments operating
voucher programs have only a general
interest in how the funds are used, just as the
university in Rosenberger did.
A final variant on the same argument is that
states imposing substantial conditions on the
schools at which vouchers are used convert
the theretofore private schools into public
schools, where the speech is government
speech. Or, put another way, a school that
chooses to accept vouchers becomes a
particular kind of public school, less
regulated than charter or community schools
but still a public school. Once the argument
reaches this point, the only reason for saying
that a school accepting vouchers under these
conditions becomes a public school is to
justify the conditions. That seems to me a
nominalism that constitutional law ought to
avoid. There is, then, substantial reason for
thinking that it is unconstitutional to exclude
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religiously affiliated schools from voucher
programs. 70
70 Davey v Locke, 299 F3d 748 (9th Cir 2002) (finding
it unconstitutional for Washington to refuse to provide
a scholarship from a program for high-achieving high
school students to a graduate who intended to use the
scholarship to pursue a degree in theology). The
argument developed in the text assumes that the Court
will follow through on the implications of
Rosenberger. Rosenberger seems to imply, for
example, that a state university must fund white
supremacist organizations if it has a student activities
fund, and that Ohio's statutory exclusion of racist
schools from voucher programs is unconstitutional. It
is not clear to me, though, how the Court could limit
Rosenberger. The suggestion that religion offers a
viewpoint, and that Rosenberger therefore involved
viewpoint-based discrimination rather than
content-based discrimination, would not seem to solve
the problem posed by organizations promulgating
racist views.
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[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
A. Blaine Amendments
Blaine Amendments are provisions of state
constitutions modeled after a federal
constitutional amendment sponsored in 1875
by James G. Blaine, a congressman with
presidential ambitions, that provided that "no
money raised by taxation in any State for the
support of public schools, or derived from
any public fund therefore, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect; nor shall any
money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or
denominations."" 8 The amendment followed
massive immigration from Ireland and
Germany that swelled the previously small
ranks of Catholics in the United States. The
movement for a federal constitutional
amendment began with President Grant's
1875 warning against a potential national
conflict "between patriotism and intelligence
on the one side, and superstition, ambition
and ignorance on the other." 20  Media
118 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875).
120 President Ulysses S. Grant, Speech to the Army of
the Tennessee (Sept. 29, 1875) (transcript available in
the Ulysses S. Grant Papers in the Library of
Congress). The feared source of "superstition,
ambition and ignorance" was the Roman Catholic
Church, rapidly growing from immigration, and
associated with an alleged papal conspiracy to
commentaries at the time recognized the
motivation behind the amendment as
anti-Catholic. As the Arizona Supreme
Court has observed, commenting on
Arizona's own version of the Blaine
Amendment, "[tihe Blaine amendment was a
clear manifestation of religious bigotry, part
of a crusade manufactured by the
contemporary Protestant establishment to
counter what was perceived as a growing
'Catholic menace."'1 22 After Blaine's
dominate the country. President Grant proposed to
"[e]ncourage free schools and resolve that not one
dollar of money appropriated to their support, no
matter how raised, shall be appropriated to the support
of any sectarian school." Id. President Grant
requested a constitutional amendment to this effect in
his Annual Message to Congress (December 7, 1875),
reprinted in James D. Richardson, 7 Messages and
Papers of the Presidents 332, 334 (1898).
122 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Az. 1999)
(quoting Joseph J. Viterritti, Choosing Equality:
Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity
Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 113, 146 (1996)); see also J. Viteritti, Choosing
Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil
Society (Brookings Institution Press 1999) at 152
("[A]id to religious schools did not become a
controversial subject in America until the Catholics
started to demand the same support for themselves.
The refusal of public authorities to grant such aid did
not arise from any well- established constitutional
doctrine or from a high-minded desire to protect
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amendment barely failed in the Congress, 123
state after state either voluntarily adopted
similar Blaine Amendments to their
constitutions, or were forced by Congress to
enact such amendments to their constitutions
as a condition of their admittance into the
Union.124
Twenty-five state constitutions contain
so-called Blaine Amendments that prohibit
those states from appropriating money or
property to aid, maintain, or support a
religious organization. Also, provisions from
twenty state constitutions specifically
proscribe state aid, maintenance, or support
religious freedom, but rather from a raw hatred of
Catholics, especially the Irish.").
123 The proposal received strong backing in both
Houses of Congress but fell four votes short of the
required two-thirds majority in the Senate to succeed.
The vote was 180-7 in the House of Representatives
and 28-16 (27 members not voting) in the Senate.
Senator Stevenson stated during the Senate debate,
"No man can mistake the object of this debate. We all
see where it tends. But I hope the great issues of this
campaign will not be covered up, however, in such
system as this, of in this nineteenth century attempting
to go to the Pope of Rome to scare the people of the
free thirty-seven States ...." 4 Cong. Rec. (44th Cong.,
Ist Sess.) 5589 (1876). Senator Bogy stated, "I think I
know the motive and the animus which have prompted
all this thing. I do not believe it is because of a great
devotion to the principles of religious liberty ....
[A]nother animal has to be brought forth by these
matadors to engage the attention of the people in this
great arena in which in which we are soon all to be
combatants. The Pope, the old Pope of Rome, is to be
the great bull that we are all to attack." Id.
124 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4,25 Stat.
676 (1889) (enabling legislation for South Dakota,
North Dakota, Montana and Washington); Act of June
20, 1910, ch. 310, § 26, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (enabling
act for New Mexico and Arizona); Act of July 3, 1890,
ch. 656, § 8, 26 Stat. 215 (1890) (enabling legislation
for Idaho); S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 16; N.D. Const. art.
8, § 5; Mont. Const art. X, § 6; Wash. Const. arts. IX,
§ 4, I, § 11; Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 10; Idaho Const.
art. LX § 5.
of sectarian schools.126 These states include
63%, or nearly two-thirds, of the U.S.
population.127 According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, these same states include 66% of
children in poverty (9.5 million children),
and 65% of all persons in poverty (24 million
persons), in the United States. These states
also include 56% of the nation's African-
American population (19 million
African-Americans), and 80% of the nation's
Hispanic and Latino population (28 million
Hispanics and Latinos). These same states
also receive 61% of federal funds and grants
awarded to states ($900 billion in 1999).
126 See Ala. Const. art. VII, § 1 (specifically
proscribing only "direct" benefits); Ariz. Const. art. IX,
§ 10; Cal. Const. arts. IX, § 8, XVI, § 5; Colo. Const.
art. IX, § 7; Del. Const. art. X, § 3; Haw. Const. art. X,
§ 1; Idaho Const. art. IX, § 5; Ill. Const. art. X, § 3;
Kan. Const. art. 6, § 6; Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 1
(prohibiting support to the school and its students, but
providing that parochial school busing is acceptable);
Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 2; Miss. Const. art. VIII, §
208; Mo. Const. art. IX, § 8; Mont. Const. art. X, § 6;
N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83; N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 3; N.D.
Const, art. 8, § 5; S.C. Const. art. XI, § 4 (specifically
proscribing only "direct" benefits); S.D. Const. art.
VIII, § 16; Utah Const. art. X, § 9; Wash. Const. art.
IX, § 4 (providing that all schools "supported wholly
or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from
sectarian control or influence"); see also Ky. Const. §
189; Va. Const. art. VIII, § 10. These anti-aid
provisions are often accompanied by provisions
prohibiting aid to religious institutions generally. Two
of these provisions also expressly ban "indirect" aid to
sectarian schools. See Mont. Const. art. V, § 6; N.Y.
Const. art. XI, § 3.
127 The census figures in this section are derived from
those made available by the United States Census
Bureau at http:// quickfacts.census.gov/qfd.
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